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This paper explores how the elimination of Madagascar’s Vanilla Marketing
Board (VMB) in 1993 affected prices paid to farmers, incentives and indi-
cators of poverty and inequality using household survey data and simulation
analysis. Following the reforms, margins between FOB and farmgate prices
have narrowed down, and the analysis of changes in poverty and inequality
based on household surveys suggests a reduction in poverty and a muted
supply response. A counterfactual analysis based on the observed reduction
in intermediation margins shows that, however limited, increase in compe-
tition among intermediaries has contributed to raise purchase prices and
the cash income of vanilla farmers. After taking into account the reduction
in Madagascar’s monopoly power on the world vanilla market implied by
the elimination of the VMB, the induced rise in producer prices is estimated
to have lifted about 20,000 individuals out of poverty.
JEL classification: F14, O11, O12
1. Introduction
In most low-income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), poverty is above all a rural phenomenon. Thus, reducing
poverty means first and foremost raising the incomes of farmers.
Although all farmers should ultimately benefit from pro-market
reforms, those engaged in the production of cash crops, in particular,
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export ones, are most susceptible to be reached by the trade reforms
adopted by many SSA countries since the 1990s. However, although
the failure of pro-reform policies is by now well documented, much
uncertainty remains on the effect of those reforms.
The wave of pro-market reforms of the 1990s appeared against a
backdrop of widespread failure in government intervention.
Although sometimes justified on theoretical grounds (as in the
case of vanilla), marketing boards and stabilisation funds led to ill-
fated outcomes documented in a growing body of well-documented
case studies (see e.g., Krueger et al., 1988; Schiff and Valdes, 1992;
Jaffee and Morton, 1995; McMillan et al., 2004). Reasons behind
the failures are multiple. Export crops are often extracted from a
narrow geographic and economic base, meaning few supplier
countries and often, also, few intermediaries in the export trade.
Those situations suggest a high potential for strategic interaction
over the appropriation of rents (Bohman et al., 1996; McMillan
2001). Typically, particularly in SSA after independence, govern-
ment intervention in the form of marketing boards ostensibly
meant to exploit monopoly power externally and shelter farmer
incomes from world-price volatility internally. However, weak
public institutions associated with the failure of farmers to organise
for the defence of their interests meant a widening wedge between
FOB and farmgate prices, the difference being appropriated by
various combinations of organised groups. In particular, export
structures specialised in ‘point-source’ (as opposed to diffuse)
natural resources such as vanilla proved strongly associated with
weak public institutions and low growth (Isham et al., 2005).
Throughout the 1990s, along with complementary sectoral
reforms (e.g., privatisation of processing, removal of price controls
and taxes), marketing boards and stabilisation funds were largely
eliminated throughout SSA, as was the case for vanilla when
several decades of interventionist policies associated with what
could be described as the Vanilla Marketing Board (VMB) were dis-
mantled starting in 1993. In retrospect, reforms in SSA have met
with varying degrees of success. If reform appraisal is sometimes
complicated by the policies of importing countries (as in the case
of cotton), domestic reforms deemed necessary have often been
either slow, as in the case of the four major West African cotton pro-
ducers (Baffes, 2005), or controversial, as in the case of cashew nuts
in Mozambique (McMillan et al., 2003).
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Lacking the necessary household surveys before and after the
reforms, it is hard to know how rural poverty has been affected
by these reforms. With household surveys (1993, 1997, 1999, 2001)
straddling the reforms when export taxation and the VMB were
eliminated around 1995, Madagascar’s vanilla reform is an excep-
tion. Yet, the 10 years since reform have featured several unforeseen
events, renewed turbulence on the vanilla market and changes in
the distribution of the gains from trade, which makes it a challenge
to identify the distributional effects of the reforms, which is the
focus of this case study.
Vanilla in Madagascar is a particularly interesting case to study
the hurdles that reforms must overcome to be successful. The
characteristics of the vanilla market and of vanilla preparation
suggest sufficient externalities and market failures (e.g., asym-
metric quality information) to justify intervention of the type that
was initially set up. So if opportunistic behaviour could be con-
trolled, cooperation among agents involved in the value chain
leading to export would be optimal both to overcome market fail-
ures and to exploit its monopoly power on high-quality
(‘Bourbon’) vanilla.
Thus, put in historical perspective, the argument for reform was
not a welfare one, as transparent cooperation between all domestic
agents would have been—taking the market-failure arguments at
face value and putting the political environment’s realities aside—
Madagascar’s first best. Instead, the argument was essentially
(i) a comparison of second-bests and (ii) of a distributional nature.
It was a comparison of second-bests because the pre-reform state
of play was very far from the cooperative optimum, as the market-
ing board simultaneously expropriated vanilla farmers through
very low farmgate prices while setting the FOB price substantially
above the static revenue-maximising level even taking into account
the reaction of followers (de Melo et al., 2000). The marketing
board’s perplexing behaviour implied that the argument for
reform was to replace the unsustainable over-exploitation of a
dwindling market power by its under-exploitation in an imperfect-
competition equilibrium on the domestic intermediation market.
The distributional aspect of the argument involved the redistri-
bution of rents from urban elites (intermediaries and political
beneficiaries) towards farmers. However, even at this high level
of simplicity, the argument was less than straightforward as
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vanilla-growing farmers, although poor in absolute terms, were still
relatively high up in the distribution of rural incomes. So ironically,
reform, if successful, had the potential to ‘widen’ rural income
inequality.
Following a description that details the organisation and market
structure of the vanilla sector and highlights the characteristics of
vanilla farmers revealed in the four household surveys used in
this study in Section 2 and a summary of the key phases in the evol-
ution of Madagascar’s policies in the vanilla sector in Section 3,
Section 4 launches into an assessment of the reforms. We adopt a
two-pronged strategy. First, drawing on household surveys and
several sources of price data, we look at price, quantity and income-
distribution indicators in the vanilla region which reveal a substan-
tial reduction in the intermediation margins following the reforms
and rather small impacts on income distribution and poverty, the
latter result being largely attributable to the fact that vanilla is a
rather small share of household income. These results prompted
us to complement the household-based appraisal with a simulation
model of the vanilla market leading to a counterfactual experiment
in which we compare a current (i.e. calibrated) equilibrium
with the one that would prevail under the old export-monopoly-
cum-export-tax regime in which we resuscitate the VMB. This
counterfactual plausibly corroborates the rise in farmgate prices
observed in the data following the abolishment of the VMB. The
simulated price and quantity effects from the counterfactual are
then re-injected into estimates of the distribution of income to simu-
late the distributional and poverty implications of the elimination
of the policies associated with the VMB. Conclusions follow in
Section 5.
2. The Vanilla Sector
Smuggled out of Mexico by Cortes in 1520, vanilla was introduced
to the Re´union, then called Ile Bourbon, around 1793, but without
the complementary bee that carried out the pollination. Vanilla pro-
duction had to wait for the discovery of hand pollination in 1836.
From then on, its cultivation for export to the Metropole was
encouraged by colonial authorities, although for technical
reasons; unlike other tropical crops, its production could never be
carried out in large plantations.
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Low in bulkiness, vanilla has a high unit value and is highly
differentiated across origins. Madagascar’s vanilla is considered
high quality because of its high vanillin content (1.5–2%), and sub-
stitutability is low between beans of different origins (‘Bourbon’,
which denotes beans from Madagascar, Comoros and Re´union,
versus the Mexican, Java and Bali’s ‘Bourbon-like’ quality).
Vanilla is the only spice that benefits from a ‘standard of identity’
helping to shield it from competition by substitutes. Synthetic
vanilla, which is cheaper than the natural one, accounts for the
bulk of the overall vanilla market (about 20,000 tons per year, of
which natural accounts for 10–15%). Tonnages on the natural
vanilla market have hovered between 1,500 and 2,500 tons per
year worldwide with no clear trend.1
2.1. Organisation and Market Structure2
For what follows, it is useful to describe the three stages involved in
the production of vanilla prior to exporting. Figure 1 shows these
stages: (i) vanilla growing, which produces the ‘green’ beans;
(ii) curing, the stage at which it develops its quality (flavour
profile and natural vanillin content); (iii) packing (sorting,
grading and tying in small homogenous bunches). Each stage
requires specific skills.
Growing is highly labour-intensive, as crop husbandry requires
260 man-days per hectare during the first year and about 460
during the 4–8 years where plants reach maturity. Pruning and
weeding are then supplemented by hand-pollination—which
1 Like other primary products, natural vanilla faces a constant threat from techni-
cal change. For instance, a German flavour and biotech company, Symrise, was
recently reported to have made advances in the development of natural vanillin
by fermentation with genetically modified bacteria of Eugenol, the conventional
(and cheap) source of artificial vanillin. Although European hostility towards
GMOs has convinced Symrise’s management to put its GM vanillin project tem-
porarily on hold, once on the market, this technology could increase competition
for natural vanilla (see www.genet-info.org).
2 This section draws from Blarel & Dolinsky (1995). Ecott (2004) narrates the fascina-
tionwith vanilla since the timewhen theAztecs demanded vanilla as a tax from the
people of the central and high plateaus of the country we now call Mexico. In
addition to a history of vanilla’s origins and its development, his book describes
in great detail the organisation of vanilla production and its use by the flavouring
industry (see the narrative of his visit to the Nielsen-Massey factory), and docu-
ments some of the clashes in the Madagascar’s vanilla market (see Chapters 11
and 13).
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means that each flower on the vine has to be pollinated by hand and
at different times—and harvesting.3 Most workers engaged in
growing belong to the family and very few producers turn to
employed workers (Government of Madagascar (GOM), 2003).
This is mostly due to the meticulous work required for vanilla pro-
duction. With few purchased inputs (producers need very little
equipment and pesticides are useless), entry and exit costs are
low although plants require over three years to become productive,
and growing conditions are rather exacting (small tracts of rich soil
under the shade of trees).
Curing entails dipping beans in near-boiling water, then trigger-
ing an enzymatic reaction by alternate heating and ‘sweating’,
which means boxing the beans and exposing them to sunlight.
The process is repeated 10–20 times before the beans are left to
dry outdoors for 2–3 months. By then, they possess a uniform
dark colour and strongly smell of vanilla.
Once cured, vanilla beans are prepared, packed and stored in
order to keep their flavour, a stage that is peculiar to Indian Ocean
producers. The storage process, which can last up to two years, is
Figure 1: Organisation of the Vanilla Sector in Madagascar
3 Ecott (2004) is essential reading for anyone interested in the ‘story’ of vanilla.
Chapter 4 describes the discovery of hand-pollination in La Re´union in the nine-
teenth century.
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risky, as vanilla canmould andweekly inspections are required. The
required expertise creates a barrier to entry compounded by the cost
of maintaining a high-value stock. Though it need not be the case,
packers often export, and importers from the three main importing
countries—the USA, France and Germany—keep close and lasting
marketing contacts with exporters.
Several of a bean’s quality characteristics are unobservable and
largely determined by growing conditions, time of harvest and
the curing process. This asymmetric information can make it tempt-
ing for individual growers and/or curers to free-ride, in particular
by early harvest, giving rise to a prisoner’s dilemma.4 The resulting
market failure could in principle be addressed by a variety of
market mechanisms, including vertical integration, branding or
industry standards.
As a matter of fact, vertical integration between farming and pro-
cessing is virtually nonexistent. If incentives to vertically integrate
between curers and packers are stronger to overcome information
asymmetries, they are still limited because the activities require
specific skills. In the absence of vertical integration, the industry
has developed weaker mechanisms to alleviate adverse-selection
issues, such as the introduction of identification marks that
remain visible after curing.
Virtually, all packers have traditionally been Malagasy compa-
nies, some owned by ethnic Chinese. Although in the mid-1990s
there were about 45 packers, five of them largely controlled the
business (Blarel and Dolinsky, 1995), and the top three exporters
accounted for two-thirds of Madagascar’s exports. This high con-
centration arguably resulted as much from government policies
and rent-seeking as from economic rationality (marketing external-
ities and the like). Prior to its elimination, CAVAGI (French acronym
for Vanilla Stabilization Fund) was the quasi-sole purchaser from
the packers.
4 Five months after flowering, vanilla beans have reached their optimal size but
contain less than 1% of vanillin. In order to reach a vanillin content of about
2% (the norm for Bourbon vanilla), the beans must be harvested at least eight
months after flowering. Fringe traders can thus be tempted to compete on collec-
tion dates. That is, if trader i collects at date t, trader j has an incentive to collect at
date t21. Depending on his discount rate, the farmer can be induced, in equili-
brium, to sell his vanilla too early—though this competition can only take place
over a short period—leading to rent dissipation pretty much like in patent races.
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2.2. Vanilla Farming
We now turn to a characterisation of vanilla farms on the basis of stat-
istical information from Madagascar’s four household surveys (EPM
under their French acronym standing for ‘Enqueˆtes Permanentes de
Me´nages’): 1993, 1997, 1999 and 2001 carried out in the country’s six
provinces (Table 1). Vanilla farming is concentrated on about 30,000
ha of plantations in the so-called SAVA zone (Sambava, Antalaha,
Vohe´mar and Andapa) in the North-Eastern province of
Antsiranana, with smaller numbers in the Toamasina province, thus
covering two out of the six provinces. Owing to differences in cover-
age and sampling methods, comparisons across surveys are tricky
(Paternosto et al., 2001), but will be carried out here since this is the
only detailed micro data at our disposal to identify who the farmers
are. Table 1 describes the geographical distribution of farming activi-
ties. Because of its labour-intensive characteristics, vanilla is ill-suited
for large-scale plantations. The number of farms involved in vanilla
production fluctuates between 50,000 and 100,000.5
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for vanilla farmers and for the
EPM’s average (more detailed descriptive statistics for the EPM’s
average can be found in the discussion paper version of the paper).
Unfortunately, this is not a panel, so different households are included
in each survey.6 Up to 200 vanilla-growing households were included
in each survey, which represents about 5% of the households sur-
veyed. Comparing the characteristics of vanilla farmers in column 2
with the nationwide averages in column 1 suggests that they are
quite close to the nationwide average. Two differences, however: a
higher proportion of vanilla farmers are in the ‘medium remoteness’
category and, more importantly, vanilla farmer incomes are 15%
above the national average (even though the first 5–6 deciles among
vanilla farmers are below the poverty line according to each
survey). Also, compared with other agricultural activities, concen-
tration in vanilla farming is less than the nationwide EPM average.
Thus, in spite of the very low nationwide average income, higher pro-
ducer prices received by vanilla farmers could contribute to widen
rural inequality rather than reduce it.
5 Data from Madagascar’s EPMs suggest a figure about 90,000 with a substantial
error margin because of imperfect stratification. A producer organisation quotes
70,000 farmers in 2004.
6 The variables used in this study were selected so as to be completely comparable
across the four surveys.
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Table 1: Agricultural Population by Main Crop and Region, 1998
Crop/region Share in total number of producers (%), by crop Number of
producers
Share in
total (%)
Antananarivo Mahajanga Fianarantsoa Toamasina Antsiranana Toliary
Rice 22.4 11.1 26.7 18.3 12.9 8.7 2,804,244 30.9
Other food crops 40.4 7.0 14.9 13.4 5.8 18.5 4,402,227 48.5
Sub-total food crops 33.4 8.6 19.5 15.3 8.6 14.7 7,206,471 79.5
Sugar cane 7.3 18.0 32.5 21.3 10.6 10.2 422,267 4.7
Cotton 0.0 25.0 0.0 8.2 4.1 62.7 20,783 0.2
Tobacco 22.6 24.0 33.4 5.0 2.2 12.8 82,244 0.9
Peanuts 27.0 8.7 30.4 5.9 2.0 26.1 575,794 6.3
Sub-total cash crops 18.6 13.7 30.9 11.8 5.3 19.7 1,101,088 12.1
Coffee 1.2 3.2 41.2 32.8 19.9 1.6 480,897 5.3
Vanilla 0.0 3.4 0.5 17.1 79.0 0.0 93,796 1.0
Pepper 0.0 0.9 70.0 11.3 17.6 0.1 54,230 0.6
Cloves 0.0 3.7 7.3 80.6 8.4 0.0 127,908 1.4
Cocoa 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.9 94.9 0.0 5,883 0.1
Sub-total export crops 0.8 3.1 32.2 37.1 25.6 1.0 762,714 8.4
Total 28.9 8.7 22.0 16.7 9.6 14.1 9,070,273 100
Source: World Bank (2001).
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3. Madagascar’s Vanilla Policy: 1960–20037
This section summarises the three successive phases inMadagascar’s
vanilla policy since independence, the first two following a pattern
common to much of SSA. Throughout the colonial period (not
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Vanilla Farming: Household Surveys (Averages for 1993,
1997, 1999, 2001)
All, 1993–2001 Vanilla
Sample size 9,504 578
Family size 5.12 5.08
Number of communes 450 34
Household head gender (proportion of households in category)
Male 0.85 0.87
Female 0.15 0.13
Household head education (proportion of households in category)
None 0.31 0.25
Primary 0.54 0.58
Secondary 0.16 0.16
Cropland surface (ha) 1.51 2.72
Land tenure (proportion of households in category)
Owned 77.68 79.54
Sharecropping 4.42 5.45
Rented 3.82 3.30
%Households outstanding loan 4.18 1.75
Remoteness (proportion of households in category)
Low 0.37 0.26
Medium 0.43 0.57
High 0.20 0.17
Yearly expenditure per capita
Thousand Malagasy Francs 102.92 126.15
US dollars at PPP 27.78 30.32
Share of livestock sales in cash income 0.22 0.06
Share of crop sales in full income 0.14 0.32
First-crop share in total harvest 0.58 0.49
Source: EPM, 1993–2001.
7 Descriptions of Madagascar’s vanilla policies are few. Apart from de Melo et al.
(2000), which only covers the period up to 1990, to our knowledge, the only
account is in Blarel & Dolinsky (1995), which is dated and of difficult access.
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coveredhere), the vanillamarket had beenmarred byprice instability,
low-farmgate prices and collusion among traders. Interestingly, the
price volatility, trader concentration and hands-off government
policy, which were the hallmarks of the colonial period–and
prompted government intervention after independence–also charac-
terise the current, post-reform regime. One essential difference,
though, is that the contestability of the worldwide vanilla market
has increased, making a swing of the pendulum back to intervention-
ism unlikely.
3.1. Phase 1 (1960–75)
Right after independence, the Government of President Tsiranana
intervened, setting up institutionswith a twin objective: (i) correcting
market failures and externalities in a bid to develop world demand
for vanilla, and (ii) bring more stability and equity in the distribution
of the gains from vanilla trade.8 AVanilla Stabilization Fund (VSF—
CAVAGI under its French acronym) was created together with a
licensing committee overseeing export trade. At all stages of the
production process described earlier, prices were set by the auth-
orities according to a cost-plus formula, the diffe´rentiel. Under this
institutional set-up, the VSF was committed to buy all production
at a pre-specified price and to stock it. Curers, packers and exporters
had to obtain a licence to operate, and the date when the season for
selling green vanilla was allowed to start was set by decree.
As described by Blarel & Dolinsky (1995), the government’s
primary objective was to establish conditions for an orderly market
that would continue to rely on the private sector, notably by setting
up the regulatory foundations for an inter-professional vanilla organ-
isation (GNIV). Nonetheless, from the start, the registration of
packers–exporters was also intended to limit competition and entry,
an objective that was surely favoured by established incumbents.
8 At the production stage, measures included the registration of vanilla growers,
regulation of the marketing season for green vanilla to prevent harvesting
before maturity and the branding process described above. At the curing
stage, registration required compliance with minimum quality standards—
essentially not to purchase immature vanilla beans. Packers–exporters also
had obligations (purchase all vanilla beans on the market and store them with
exports controlled by a quality department) which were overseen by a licensing
committee. In the early years, the licensing committee which also oversaw the
activities of the GNIV and the VSF was collegial, being composed of representa-
tives from the private sector and the government.
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In 1962, an Indian Ocean cartel called the ‘Vanilla Alliance’ was
formed with the Comoros and the Re´union. Its objective was to take
advantage of the region’s huge market power over the world’s
second most expensive spice, but also to correct externalities and
bring the collective action necessary to develop the market by
generic market promotion in the major consuming countries, and
to insure quality. In the mid-1970s, the cartel’s worldwide market
share was above 80%. Between CAVAGI and the ‘Vanilla
Alliance’, vanilla was governed by a marketing board, hence our
reference to the system as the VMB.
Figure 2 shows that government intervention was initially fol-
lowed with positive results, with the world market expanding
rapidly and Madagascar exports up by a factor of 5 in the 15
years following independence. It is also the phase when
Madagascar established its lead in the market for vanilla. Blarel
and Dolinsky (p. 295) conclude that this first phase was successful
both on equity grounds, as the FOB price was about equally
divided between growers, packers and the GOM/GAVAGI, and
on efficiency grounds as the farmers’ supply response was strong
and quality maintained.
Figure 2: Madagascar’s Vanilla Unit Values, Market Share and Export Volumes,
1965–2003. Source: Blarel & Dolinsky (1995), COMTRADE (mirror statistics),
authors’ calculations
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3.2. Phase 2 (1975–93)
Starting in the mid-1970s, the Socialist revolution of President
Didier Ratsiraka took the country into a State-led import-
substitution development strategy that rapidly threw the vanilla
sector, like the rest of the economy, into disarray. Although the insti-
tutional set-up remained largely unchanged, policy became
increasingly prone to rent-seeking, inefficiency and corruption.
Growers were required to hold three-year licenses and processor-
stockers annual ones, both granted by the Ministry of Trade, which
also hand-picked small numbers among them (38 in 1989, 13 in
1990) for participation in the export trade. The Ministry also fixed
the export quota allotted to each authorised processor-stocker.
Again under the direction of the GOM, CAVAGI purchased the
largest part of the crop to market it directly, fixing the price for
all export transactions and those of the authorised exporters.
Export quotas were allocated to politically favoured traders as
were licences for curing and packing, resulting in a concentration
of market power in the hands of a few. The tri-partite decision
process involving growers, packers-stockers and the GOM which
had been put in place after independence collapsed, as virtually
all decisions were taken by the Ministry of Trade.
The replacement of the cooperative management system put in
place under the previous government by centralised and politically
motivated decisions led to increasingly distorted outcomes.
Internally, export taxation became confiscatory, peaking at 82% of
the pre-tax export price in the early 1990s (with the fraction of the
export price received by farmers squeezed to less than 8% (Blarel
and Dolinsky, 1995, p. 292). In spite of two exchange-rate correc-
tions, in 1987 and in 1994, extortionary taxation was compounded,
like in many other SSA countries, by currency overvaluation. Low
producer prices discouraged plantation and maintaining quality.
It also contributed—although on a limited scale because vanilla
farmers were in small numbers—to the countryside’s descent into
poverty documented by Paternostro et al. (2001).
Externally, attempts to over-exploit monopoly rents led to the allo-
cation of unused export quotas across exports from the Indian Ocean
cartel. Even putting dynamic considerations aside, simulations
suggest that CAVAGI’s price was about twice the static welfare-
maximising level, and a third above the revenue-maximising level
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(de Melo et al., 2000), implying welfare losses adding up to about 1%
of GDP. Illegal trade flourished while the cartel’s high prices encour-
aged the entry of Indonesia into the market (Figure 3).9
Worst of all, declining revenues meant that the cost of keeping
exploding inventories (as the cartel’s high prices discouraged
demand) escalated beyond what could be financed out of CAVAGI’s
revenue. In 1993, three quarters of the stock of inventories—which
by 1990 exceeded four years’ worth of export under good times—
were ultimately burnt. Given the then high unit value of vanilla
(Figure 2), by any yardstick, the policies of the VSF were misguided
and wasteful.10
Figure 3: Market Shares on The World Vanilla Market, 1965–2003. Source: Blarel &
Dolinsky (2000), COMTRADE (mirror statistics), authors’ calculations. Notes: ROW
stands for world exports minus Madagascar and Indonesia
9 Indonesia’s entry into the vanilla sector was driven by shortages in the late 1970s.
The Government of Indonesia had no particular policy in that sector and has
never taxed exports. It is estimated that Indonesia’s costs of production are
about three times those of Madagascar and that the surge in market share start-
ing in the mid-1980s was induced by Madagascar’s policies in phase 2 (see Blarel
& Dolinsky, 1995, and de Melo et al., 2000).
10 Examples of the corruption surrounding the operation of CAVAGI are described
in Ecott (Chapter 13, especially pp. 220–223). This type of confiscatory policy
extended beyond vanilla to other sectors (e.g., rice, clove etc.) and contributed
to a trend of worsening rural poverty.
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3.3. Phase 3 (1993–2005)
The collapse of the GOM/CAVAGI system marked the beginnings
of a new period of reforms in the sector, and the elimination of
CAVAGI by Albert Zafy, who replaced Ratsiraka as president in
1993, coincided with other liberalisation measures in agriculture
(Barrett, 1994).11 This third phase, which extends to the present,
also saw the abolishment of the complexities in the licensing
system and the removal of taxes on vanilla exports in 1995.
Whether the government ‘abandoned’ the sector because
rent-extraction was largely exhausted (see Bohman et al. 1996 for
a discussion of this issue in the case of coffee in Indonesia), or
because of the policy advice by donors (when Ratsiraka was
re-elected in 1996 following the presidency of Albert Zafy, he was
in a much weaker position and had to contend with advice by
donors), the vanilla sector in Madagascar is no longer controlled
as it was in phase 2, nor is there the kind of cooperation among
interested parties that was once in place during phase 1.
Under the new system, licences are still required of processors,
but the system is a lot less constraining than it used to be, as it is
easy to qualify for a licence. As shown in Figure 4, the elimination
of CAVAGI and of export taxes was followed by a sharp reduction
of the world price. Farmgate prices received by producers rose after
1995, before taking off starting in 1999 following fires in Indonesia
and, later, cyclonic conditions in Madagascar in April 2000 (when
one-fifth of the vanilla crop was destroyed). These exogenous
events largely contributed to an overall shortage in the market for
natural vanilla.
The State’s role is now essentially confined to sanitary/quality
inspections and to setting the date and place of vanilla marketing
every year.12 Although this power alone has been shown elsewhere
11 Strictly speaking, CAVAGI was replaced by IVAMA, the Madagascar vanilla
institute, with former CAVAGI as staff. Importantly, IVAMA did not have a mon-
opoly on the amount that could be exported.
12 Arreˆte´ interministe´riel 11672/2004 of 21 June 2004 (Agriculture and Trade
Ministries of Malagasy Republic) prohibits the sales and exports of more than
100g of vanilla less than six months after harvest. Annual ministerial decisions
fix legal harvesting dates and stocking periods. In addition, the Sava region
recently issued an Arreˆte´ establishing minimum quality standards for vanilla,
partly in response to the entry of fringe, low-quality producers during the high-
price 2004 campaign. We are grateful to Sofia Bettencourt for pointing this out to
us. Also see Ecott (p. 197) for a description of the different vanilla qualities.
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to be a possible vehicle for extortion (e.g., Chad’s cotton monopoly),
with a weakened powers in Ratsiraka’s presidency, the State’s main
role was to seek to discourage the marketing of non-mature vanilla
(WTO, 2002).13 Efforts aimed at quality improvements are financed
by the EU’s Stabex fund in cooperation with the GES (Groupement
des entrepreneurs de la SAVA) under a five-million euros project
extending from 1997 to 2006.
However, 10 years after the market liberalisation, the market for
high-quality ‘bourbon’ Malagasy vanilla is not at its best. The elimi-
nation of the marketing board was followed by a loss of cohesion
between vanilla producers, collectors and exporters. Moreover,
the escalation of producer prices from year 2000 until 2005 led to
Figure 4: FAO Vanilla Farmgate and FOB Price, Deflated. Source: Table 4
13 The government’s role has not changed under the new presidency. Government
regulation of market opening dates is (at least in principle) necessary because
Government regulation is called on to control this potential market failure.
Whether Malagasy authorities succeed in their regulatory function is an open
question, as Madagascar’s vanilla market is less than fully transparent.
According to a 2003 article published by Radio France International on the
web, about a third of Madagascar’s vanilla might be sold on the parallel
market, some of which as part of money-laundering schemes (Pe´guy, 2003).
Traders associations also complain that the prohibition of early collection
makes harvests easy targets for organised crime. Large-scale thefts and armed
ambushes of traders were reported in the local press during the high-price
period of 2001–3. The situation was apparently serious enough to affect the har-
vest’s pre-financing by foreign buyers. Ecott (Chapter 11) describes thefts and
crimes related to conflicts between traders and growers.
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a rise of vanilla beans thefts together with a general increase of
violence. Finally, vanilla quality slowly decreased, which, along
with the huge price increase, encouraged world vanilla consumers
in the food industry to partly turn away from natural vanilla to
synthetic substitutes (see below).
We now turn to an assessment of the reforms, starting with a
broad inspection of aggregate data before turning to micro evidence
from the EPM and from simulation analysis.
4. Assessing the Effect of Reforms
Discerning the effects of the reforms described earlier is made diffi-
cult by several exogenous events: a major hurricane in April 2000 in
Madagascar; a contested presidential election in late 2001 that
brought the country to a standstill until July 2002 and large-scale
fires in Indonesia in 1997 which destroyed a large chunk of the
world’s supply of natural vanilla. This said, three trends and a
puzzle are apparent in Figures 2–4 since the reforms in 1993–95.
First, recent years have been marked by a contraction of world
exports (volumes contracted by about two-thirds, from 3,000 tons
to little over 1,000 tons) matched by a spectacular rise in prices
(Figures 2 and 4) and a huge decline in the intermediation margin
following the elimination of CAVAGI in 1993 (note the different
scales in Figure 4). Second, the decline in Madagascar’s market
share has reversed itself during the 1990s (Figure 3). Third, new
entrants are progressively overtaking Indonesia as the main compe-
tition facing Madagascar (Figure 3). The puzzle is that the inter-
mediation margin jumped again in 2001 (more on this below).
Interestingly, this development mirrors the early days of phase 2
when high prices triggered Indonesia’s entry. Once again, in the
wake of sharply rising prices (partly due to climatic conditions in
Madagascar, where the cyclonic conditions in 2000 were followed
by heavy rains in 2002), competition from new entrants—which
together account for more than a third of world exports—is on
the rise.14 Undeniably, the free market has certainly not stabilised
the price, and it is said that the price hike of 2004 (which saw
vanilla sold at $600 per kilo) encouraged the food industry to
14 Entrants include Costa Rica, India (whose output, at 120–130 tons, is equivalent
to the Comoros’s), Mexico and Papua-New Guinea (about 300 tons). Uganda is
also reported to be raising output and quality (see e.g., www.cgiar.org/foodnet).
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substitute up to 30% of its purchases of natural vanilla with artifi-
cial vanillin (Ecott, 2004, p. 18).
Against this background, we now turn to the EPM surveys to try
and detect evidence of the reforms on vanilla farmers. We start with
an analysis of the evolution of intermediation margins, and then
turn to parametric estimates of supply response before looking at
the evolution of regional indices of inequality and poverty.
4.1. Evidence from Household Surveys
We start with prices, intermediation margins and supply response,
and then turn to regional inequality and poverty. The elimination of
the VMB corresponds to the replacement of a state-owned mon-
opoly by a market structure for intermediaries that can be expected
to be fairly concentrated at the outset but to become more competi-
tive over time as entry is attracted by high intermediation margins.
Thus, except under very peculiar settings, one should expect inter-
mediation margins to narrow down over time, especially given that,
as mentioned above, CAVAGI’s margins appeared to be vastly in
excess of even a rational monopoly’s optimal level.
4.1.1. Intermediation, Margins and Supply Response
Table 3 gives the evolution of vanilla prices from different sources:
EPM surveys, FAO data, GOM and COMTRADE data. There is a
large discrepancy in the series even though the farmgate prices
show the same increasing trend across the series: according to the
EPM survey, farmgate prices increase over eightfold in real terms
over the period 1993–2001 while the corresponding increase in
the FAO series is less than fourfold, and the government figures
are flat over the available period (1993–97). In general, the FAO
and COMTRADE CIF series (based on mirror importer statistics
deemed to be more reliable) are quite close as can be seen from
comparing the last two columns.15
15 Note however that the FAO FOB prices are higher than the COMTRADE CIF
prices between 1996 and 2001. Note however that FAO farmgate prices are in
all likelihood prices quoted by established traders. It is possible, though unver-
ified, that parallel exports were purchased from farmers at higher prices.
Furthermore, there are discrepancies between FOB and CIF series in
COMTRADE data (see the discussion in Hummels & Lugovsky, 2006).
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Table 3: Farmgate, FOB and CIF Vanilla Prices, 1991–2001
Year EPM average pro-
ducer price
Government
farmgate price,
FMG
FAO farmgate
price, FMG
Percentage of FAO FOB
market price received by
producers
Percentage of COMTRADE
CIF market price received
by producers
1 2 3 4 5
Current Constant Current Constant Current Constant
1991 2,000 2,526 1.51 1.47
1992 5,000 5,416 3.67 3.81
1993 4,062 4,062 2,875 2,875 5,000 5,000 3.67 3.83
1994 4,500 3,217 8,450 6,040 3.96 4.54
1995 7,550 3,583 10,000 4,746 4.22 4.75
1996 5,750 2,293 5,150 2,053 6.85 4.15
1997 17,788 6,813 7,500 2,873 10,500 4,022 14.04 10.37
1998 10,500 3,794 10,500 3,794 10.60 8.28
1999 21,950 7,068 25,000 8,050 23.44 17.55
2000 66,250 18,673 30.13 26.05
2001 133,559 35,202 69,828 18,404 11.67 11.48
Source: FAO, COMTRADE, EPM, MAEP.
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Whatever price information is used, Table 3 gives support to a
shortage-induced price hike mentioned above, but also more
importantly it provides evidence of a reduction in intermediation
margins. First, world prices went up sharply between 1999
and 2001, from FMG 200,000 to 600,000 per kilogram. According
to various press and professional sources, prices continued to
climb until 2004, reaching close to US $150/kg, only to collapse
abruptly in the fall of 2004, settling at US $60/kg (FMG 600,000 at
the 2004 exchange rate). Prices were also oriented downwards in
2005. The high prices of 2001–3, partly due to the fact that hurri-
cane ‘Hudah’ in April 2000 wiped out about a third of the
region’s output and 15% of its stocks,16 are widely reported to
have encouraged the entry of informal traders in the market, with
consequent loss of control by established traders and government
authorities.
Second, as expected, the elimination of CAVAGI in 1993 immedi-
ately translated into a sharp increase in the fraction of vanilla FOB
prices retained by producers, from a low of less than 2% in 1991 to a
high of 30% in 2000 (Figure 4). However, Figure 4 reveals that the
squeeze in intermediation margins abruptly reversed itself
in 2001, a year in which none of the sharp increase in export
prices was retained by producers whose farmgate prices stayed
flat, at least according to the FAO data. This puzzling change
noted earlier is however partly elucidated when one looks at
columns 4 and 5 in Table 3, which indicate unusually high producer
prices in 1999 and 2000 while the margins in 2001 correspond to
those that had established around 1998 after the removal of the
VMB.17
Figure 5 shows hectares planted, yields and vanilla output over a
20-year period straddling CAVAGI’s elimination. As is obvious
from the figure, there is little prima facie evidence of a strong
16 See www.vanilla.com. Hurricane damage on production capacity persists for
about three years, the plant’s maturing period. The wet season in 2002 also
accounted for a poor harvest whose effects on supply were felt two years
later in 2004.
17 The 2% figure for 1991 is probably an underestimate. Blarel & Dolinsky (1995,
p. 292) quote a figure of 8% but suggest that this number is itself an upper
bound, so the truth is likely to be somewhere between 2 and 8%. In any case,
both FAO or GOM prices series yield very similar estimates of reductions in
intermediation margins. As to the reasons for the abrupt changes in 1999 and
2000, one could appeal to the exogenous climatic factors in Madagascar and
Indonesia.
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supply response to the reduction in intermediation margins over
1995–2001. This is not surprising given the unstable climatic con-
ditions in 2000, the three-year delay between plantation and
harvest time and the unrest surrounding the presidential elections
of 2001. This is somewhat confirmed by a report on the Sava region
(‘Monographie de la re´gion de la Sava’, GOM, 2003), which states
that the increase in vanilla-planted area following the elimination
of the marketing board corresponds to a better care given to
vanilla sprouts and to the renewal of old sprouts rather than to a
physical increase in plantation. However, according to
local sources, an increase in planted areas in the Sava region did
take place in 2004, and the parametric estimates below also
suggest some supply response. Overall, the data in Figure 5
suggest that the improvement in Madagascar’s market share obser-
vable in Figure 3 is likely to reflect more the slackening of the com-
petitive pressure from Indonesia than a positive domestic supply
response to the improved price signals received by Malagasy
vanilla farmers.
To check further on farmers’ behaviour, we now turn to a para-
metric analysis. Farmers’ decisions to grow vanilla or not are
likely to be related to how much they would grow if they
decided to go ahead; pretty much like, the decision to participate
in the labour force is related to how many hours one would
Figure 5: Vanilla Areas Planted, Yield and Output, 1980–2001. Source: FAO stat
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supply if participating.18 Accordingly we fit a two-stage Heckman
model (equation (1)) with a production equation (whose dependent
variable is vanilla output) and a participation equation (whose
dependent variable is 1 for farmers who grow any vanilla and 0
for others). The selection equation is identified using location and
community characteristics. We estimate the following two-stage
selection model over approximately 500 vanilla farmers for each
one of two household surveys (1997 and 1999):
yit ¼ Xitbþ uit;
Iit ¼ Zitgþ vit;
Iit ¼
1 if Iit . 0
0 otherwise
;

i ¼ 1; :::; n
t ¼ 1; :::; 2;
ð1Þ
where yit is the log of farm i’s vanilla output in survey t, Iit is equal
to one when farm i grows vanilla in survey year t and Iit
* represents
the net benefit of growing vanilla and is latent. X is a vector of
household characteristics likely to influence a farmer’s portfolio
choice and productivity, whereas Z is a vector of household and
community characteristics–including location–likely to influence
a farmer’s decision or ability to grow vanilla at all.
We are mainly interested in the relationship between partici-
pation decisions and vanilla prices, but with a cross-section there
is no variability in prices (who are the same for all farmers)
except for changes across surveys (i.e., up to four values if we
included all surveys). Accordingly, we construct a farmer-specific
index of the past change in the price of long-term crops using
FAO price series for the last 10 years and current production
weights. A positive coefficient in front of this variable in the selec-
tion equation indicates that, ceteris paribus, a past increase in the
price of long-term crops makes it more likely for a farmer to
18 Technically, omitted variables such as a farmer’s ability or equipment may influ-
ence both his decision to grow vanilla and how much to grow, which implies
cov(uit, nit)= 0, see equations below.
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grow vanilla if that farmer already had a large share of long-term
crops, i.e., if his land was suitable.
However, as explained by Paternostro et al. (2001), comparability
across household surveys is quite limited. As they explain, the 1993
survey was a year-long survey, while the 1997 and 1999 surveys
were the three month priority surveys. These surveys come close
to a panel since approximately 60% of the households in the 1999
survey had been part of the 1997 survey (p. 73). As to the 2001
survey, not only was there a change in the coverage of goods enter-
ing the consumption basket, with more goods consumed by the
poor, but there was also a change in the sampling methodology,
as the proportion of urban households sampled increased
(Romani, 2003). Given the discrepancies between the 1999 and
2001 surveys, except when noted explicitly, in the results below
we confine ourselves to the 1997 and 1999 surveys. Admittedly,
because of data limitations, with only two surveys, this is a very
indirect test of the supply response to price changes. Accordingly,
results should be interpreted very cautiously.
The definition of the variables are in Table 4 and results are
shown in Table 5. Regarding the choice of community character-
istics entering the selection equation, because of their large
number, we relied on a systematic search.19 As to the appropriate-
ness of Heckman’s model, the null hypothesis of independence of
the two equations (selection and production) is rejected at the 1%
level, so a probit on the selection equation would produce incon-
sistent estimates.
Starting with the selection equation, farm size is a highly signifi-
cant determinant of farmers’ choice to grow vanilla, suggesting that
vanilla production is a sort of luxury for farms with enough land to
grow other (food) crops. In accordance with the description of
vanilla farming, input and fertiliser use enter negatively in the
decision to grow vanilla. Most of the other community character-
istics also enter with plausible signs, all suggesting that vanilla is
mostly grown by isolated and precarious farmers in unsafe areas.
However, the positive and significant sign on total revenue
suggests that vanilla farmers are the ‘rich’ among the very poor,
which is not surprising considering that vanilla is an export crop
19 We relied on the systematic selection procedure used by Sala-i-Martin (1997).
We did not apply this procedure to the output equation because only a few vari-
ables in the household surveys were likely to affect supply.
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Table 4: Description of Variables
Cropland size Number of squared metres of land the
household crops or has in fallow, in logs
Owner Proportion of owned cropped land
Tenant Proportion of rented cropped land
Sharecropper Proportion of cropped land in sharecropping
Inputs Dummy indicating whether the household
used inputs in its production; 1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ no
Fertiliser use Share of the farmers of the community who
use fertilisers. 0 ¼ 0%, 1  5%, 2 ¼ 5–25%,
5  75%
Outstanding loan Dummy indicating whether the household
has a loan meant for agriculture; 1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ no
Rain Quantity of rain in the last year
Disturbances Index indicating the risk of atmospheric dis-
turbances. Goes from 0 ¼ low risk to
5 ¼ high risk
Frequency of droughts Number of years with droughts between 1999
and 2001
Frequency of locust attacks Number of years with locust attacks between
1999 and 2001
Frequency of epizootic disease Number of years with epizootic disease
between 1999 and 2001
Travel time to the next town Number of hours of travelling to reach the
next town
Population in the village Number of persons in the village
Share of agricultural population Share of the population of the community in
the agricultural sector
Farmers association Farmers association dummy indicating
whether the village where the household
lives has an association of farmers; 1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ no
Agricultural extension service Dummy indicating if the village could benefit
from agricultural extension service;
1 ¼ yes, 2 ¼ no
Community cattle Size of the cattle in the village
Number of break-in Number of break-in in the village between
1999 and 2001
(continued on next page )
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while most farmers grow food crops for self-consumption. Finally,
the positive coefficient on long-term20 crops’ past price changes
(a weighted average of their price changes over the past 10 years
using current weights in farm production) suggests a positive
supply response through entry, although, as mentioned, this must
be interpreted cautiously.
Logically, the supply equation indicates that inputs and fertiliser
use increase supply (even if they do not affect the planting
decision). Somewhat surprisingly, the 1999 dummy enters with a
negative sign, suggesting a lower output compared than for 1997.
Given that adverse climatic conditions occurred in 2000, this is
somewhat surprising since producer price was rising and adverse
weather conditions occurred in the Spring 2000. However, when
we ran a similar regression (not reported here) including all four
surveys including year dummies (except for 1993) in the supply
equation, as expected the dummy variables for 1997 and 1999
were positive and significant and the dummy variable for 2001
was negative. It is thus difficult to detect output effects of the abol-
ishment of CAVAGI.
4.1.2. Regional Inequality and Poverty
At less than 100,000 (1% of the total), the number of vanilla farmers
is too small for vanilla policy to affect nationwide measures of
Table 4: Continued
Presence of police Presence of police in the village; 1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ no
Independency ratio Number of working persons in the household
over household size
Average age in household Household members’ average age
Household head schooling Household head’s last achieved school year.
1–6: primary school; 7–13: secondary
school; 14–18: university
Total revenue Household’s total revenue
Price index for long-term crops Price index for long-term crops, in logs
Price index for short-term crops Price index for short-term crops, in logs
20 Long-term crops are defined as crops that need more than 1.5 years to reach
maturity.
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Table 5: Estimation Results, Vanilla Farming Regression: 1997 and 19991
Dependent variable Vanilla ¼ 1 (selection) Ln vanilla output (kg)
Cropland size 0.28*** (4.29) 0.08 (0.96)
Owner 20.34** (2.02) 20.06 (0.28)
Sharecropper 20.56* (1.93) 20.07 (0.18)
Tenant2 20.70** (2.36) 0.65** (2.42)
Inputs (cap. equipment) 20.71*** (3.56) 0.50** (2.28)
Fertiliser use 20.35*** (4.85) 0.07** (1.98)
Outstanding loan 20.03 (0.08) 20.15 (0.33)
1999 20.62*** (6.83) 20.38*** (3.63)
Rain 25.59E-04*** (7.67)
Disturbances 20.93*** (7.56)
Frequency of droughts 20.54*** (7.29)
Frequency of locust attacks 20.11 (1.13)
Frequency of epizootic
disease
20.05*** (2.92)
Travel time to the next town 0.02*** (5.45)
Population in the village 23.97E-05*** (5.36)
Share of agricultural
population
0.02*** (2.73)
Farmers association 0.77*** (6.48)
Agricultural extension
service
1.62*** (6.51)
Community cattle 29.61E-05*** (4.16)
Number of break-in 0.02*** (11.49)
Presence of police 21.07*** (9.03)
Independency ratio 20.55*** (3.14)
Average age in household 26.40E-04 (0.17)
Household head schooling 0.02* (1.80)
Total revenue 2.83E-07*** (4.76)
Price index for long-term
crops3
12.19*** (25.22)
Price index for short-term
crops4
21.19*** (3.32)
Constant 21.07 (1.49) 3.54*** (4.38)
Observations 1464 1464
F(8, 1454) 3.61
Probability .F 0
(continued on next page)
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inequality and poverty. However, the importance of vanilla for the
Malagasy economy is still very large: vanilla constitutes a major
source of Malagasy exports revenue. Besides, revenues from the
vanilla sector represent 1.5% of Malagasy GDP.21 As vanilla
farming is concentrated in just two provinces (Antsiranana and,
to a much lesser extent, Toamasina), it makes sense to explore the
evolution of inequality and poverty indices for those regions in
order to track any possible aggregate effect of the 1995 change in
Madagascar’s vanilla policy. However, in order to control for
other changes that could have affected nationwide inequality and
poverty levels, we compare the vanilla regions with the other
four regions in Madagascar where vanilla is not produced.22
Furthermore, because the EPM surveys are strictly not comparable,
it is useful to compare the vanilla and non-vanilla regions within
each survey as well as the evolution in time.
Tables 6 and 7 show the evolution of poverty and inequality
measures across the four EPM surveys (ignore for now the counter-
factual column figures in table 6 giving the simulated numbers for
Table 5: Continued
Dependent variable Vanilla ¼ 1 (selection) Ln vanilla output (kg)
r5 20.96*** (-64.51)
s6 1.08*** (25.24)
t-Statistics in brackets.
1Regression for vanilla region only.
2Omitted category: landless farmers tilling community land.
3Preceding 10-year change in output-weighted Laspeyres price index.
4Preceding three-year standard deviation in output-weighted Laspeyres price
index.
5Coefficient of correlation between the two equations.
6Variance of error terms in vanilla output regression.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
21 ‘Etat des lieux de la corruption sur l’e´conomie rurale’, 2003.
22 Note that since our database includes households with agriculture as one of
their activities only, the poverty estimates given in this section are not done
on the whole population. However, since farmers represent about 90% of the
Malagasy population, our estimates themselves represent most of the
population.
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Table 6: Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap and Gini Indices (Vanilla Regions)
Headcount Headcount ratio Poverty gap ratio Gini coefficient
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
93 386,808 NA 0.841 NA 0.491 NA 0.427 NA
97 353,473 NA 0.759 NA 0.349 NA 0.366 NA
99 339,783 NA 0.723 NA 0.333 NA 0.390 NA
01 324,316 346,570 0.782 0.836 0.394 0.440 0.418 0.418
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2001). Between 1993 and 1999, the period straddling the reforms,
the headcount went down more rapidly in the non-vanilla
regions (11.6 versus 8.2 percentage points).23 A similar catching
up of the non-vanilla region is also evident from the poverty gap
and Gini figures over the same period. However, between 1997
and 1999 when vanilla prices were going up, poverty continued
to fall in the vanilla region but inequality went up. This should
not be surprising since periods of strong growth are known to
result in increases in inequality under a wide range of density func-
tions. By contrast, there is no improvement on the poverty front in
the non-vanilla regions and only a slight increase in inequality.
For both regions, poverty and inequality went up between 1999
and 2001. This trend seems plausible for the non-vanilla region as
the long-term decline in agriculture continued (with the better-off
farmers leaving the countryside for cities), but is surprising and
suspicious for the vanilla region when one inspects the data by
deciles in Table 8.
Table 7: Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap and Gini Indices (Non-vanilla Regions)
Headcount Headcount ratio Poverty gap ratio Gini coefficient
93 1,055,480 0.860 0.512 0.477
97 865,358 0.744 0.346 0.377
99 874,391 0.748 0.349 0.384
01 937,759 0.813 0.450 0.421
Source: Authors’ calculations from EPM. Poverty line defined as in Paternostro
(1999), i.e., budgetary requirements to purchase 2,100 calories a day at current
prices.
Headcount: number of individuals below poverty line; headcount number: pro-
portion of individuals (using EPM’s survey design) in poverty; poverty gap ratio:
average (poverty line-revenue)/poverty line;
counterfactual: counterfactual values obtained from baseline scenario (1v ¼ 1.0,
1s ¼ 0.5, s ¼ 4). See Appendix A for the description of model and Table A1 for
sensitivity results to changes in assumptions about elasticities.
23 The 1993 figures seem however to be overestimated: both poverty headcount
and poverty gap ratio are higher compared with Paternostro et al.’s figures.
Our 10% figure of people out of poverty might therefore in turn be
underestimated.
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Table 8: Income, Wage and Price Changes, by Vanilla and Non-vanilla Regions, 1999–2001
Decile1 Per-capita income2 % Income from
vanilla sales in total
income3
% Income from non-
vanilla sales in total
income4
Wage change
1999–20015
Producer price
change 1999–20016
Vanilla
regions
Non-vanilla
regions
Vanilla
regions
Non-vanilla
regions
Vanilla
regions
Non-vanilla
regions
Vanilla
regions
Non-vanilla
regions
Vanilla
regions
Non-vanilla
regions
1 50,034 44,596 13.8 0 39.4 37.7 3.31 0.31 20.50 20.60
2 76,673 72,304 9.8 0 33.0 42.7 4.15 1.07 3.67 0.03
3 96,165 89,165 17.8 0 24.4 31.5 2.27 1.18 0.27 0.11
4 118,190 110,145 13.3 0 34.4 33.6 2.06 0.88 0.69 20.01
5 140,270 130,377 11.8 0 22.0 35.9 0.72 1.46 0.84 20.17
6 166,974 155,203 9.7 0 26.3 34.7 3.42 1.52 20.18 0.10
7 195,187 189,817 12.3 0 29.5 34.3 2.31 1.08 1.08 20.04
8 241,774 230,948 11.0 0 26.5 28.1 1.47 1.14 0.26 21.24
9 325,682 305,814 13.3 0 17.9 25.8 1.86 0.68 1.13 20.24
10 599,147 534,520 9.4 0 27.2 30.3 1.53 0.78 20.04 20.19
1Ranked from poorest to richest.
2Decile’s average per-capita income (included estimated value of auto-consumption) in real (CPI-deflated) FMG, 1999.
3Decile’s average percentage of income from vanilla sales in total income, 1999.
4Decile’s average percentage of income from crop sales other than vanilla in total income, 1999.
51999–2001 real wage change was calculated for pseudo-panels defined by the narrowest geographical areas (i.e., villages) for
which we had observations in both years.
6Calculated as the decile’s average of the individual weighted-producer price change, itself calculated as Dpij ¼
P
j wij
P D pj
P,
where i indexes households in the decile, j indexes crops and wij
P is the weight of crop j in household i’s income. Change in
vanilla prices is not included.
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According to Table 8, vanilla revenues account for a bit more
than 10% of revenues, with no trend across deciles, while revenues
from sales of other crops accounts for another 30% of household
revenue, with a slight decline in the share for higher deciles. So,
except for the lowest deciles, crop sales account for less than half
of household income, an estimate quite close to the one for house-
hold in non-vanilla-growing regions. The low share of cash income
in total income in Malagasy households reflects the subsistence
living conditions of the poor in rural areas. While these descriptive
statistics (from the 1999 survey) could account for the deterioration
between the 1999 and 2001 EPM surveys, our estimate of wage
changes between the 1999 and 2001 EPM indicates a much larger
increase in the vanilla region, the increase being steeper for the
lower deciles. Finally, the changes in producer prices are more
favourable for the vanilla regions, with the increase in the vanilla
regions suggesting some spillovers from vanilla to other activities,
while the decline elsewhere mirrors the continuing decline of
Malagasy agriculture recounted by several observers. Together,
these results cast some doubts that, even if one factors in the
effects of cyclonic conditions and the large share of auto-
consumption for poor households, poverty and inequality indi-
cators may not have deteriorated as much as suggested by the
indicators in Tables 6 and 7 for the vanilla-growing regions.
Inspection of the household data does not reveal clear-cut
changes in inequality and poverty indices in the vanilla-growing
regions, nor is there strong evidence of supply response from the
household data. However, the price data suggest a marked
decline in intermediation margins which we exploit below in a
simulation-based counterfactual re-creating the old policy environ-
ment to try and give an answer to the question: how much did the
reforms achieve by themselves?
4.2. A Simple Counterfactual
Drawing on the econometric supply and demand estimates in de
Melo et al. (2000), let the vanilla market be approximated by
modelling three types of players: a supply side with atomistic
producers (farmers); a demand side black-boxed with a constant
price-elasticity of demand for aggregate (Madagascar and
Indonesia) natural vanilla; and a layer of imperfectly competitive
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curers–stockers–traders engaged in Cournot competition in the
middle.24 In this set-up, reminiscent of the vanilla market in
Madagascar, the taxation of exports followed during phase 2
leads to an outcome akin to double marginalisation (this is clear
from the model description in Appendix A).
The gist of the model boils down to a simple formula relating the
share of the world price retained by Madagascar’s producers as a
function of demand and supply elasticities and, more importantly,
the number of local traders. Namely, letting PM be the selling price
of Madagascar’s vanilla (whose formula is derived in Appendix A),
pM
P its farmgate producer price, s the elasticity of substitution
between Madagascar’s and Indonesia’s vanilla, sM Madagascar’s
market share and 1M
s the elasticity of supply of Madagascar’s
vanilla, the inverse of the intermediation margin, uM, is given by:
uM ¼ p
P
M
PM
¼ 1 1=sð Þ þ 1 1=sð Þ½ sM
 
1þ 1= nM1sM
   : ð2Þ
It is easily checked that uM, the share of the price accruing to
farmers, is increasing in the elasticity of supply and in the
number of traders, as raising either of those parameters reduces
their monopsonistic power.
Starting from observed mark-ups, we let the model determine
the number of traders consistent with the imposed behaviour
under the current policy regime of no taxation and no domestic
market intervention restricting entry. As indicated in Table A1 in
Appendix A, these model-generated numbers are close to the anec-
dotal evidence (about five traders, which happens to be the number
of packers that, according to Blarel & Dolinsky (1995, p. 274), domi-
nates the vanilla intermediation business). Taken at face value, this
suggests that there was little entry since the mid-1990s or that, if
there was, new entrants followed the incumbents’ pricing policy.25
24 This set-up is the same as de Melo et al.’s (2000) except for the addition of the
layer of imperfectly competitive curers–stockers–traders and the Cournot
(rather than Stackelberg) assumption describing the interaction between
Madagascar and Indonesia.
25 Our counterfactual experiment reduces the number of traders to one, based on
the assumption that they colluded during the socialist era. With export quotas,
they obviously had little incentive to compete on prices. Indeed, Blarel &
Dolinky (1995) describe a process through which the political allocation of
export licences increasingly concentrated power in the hands of a single
Elimination of Madagascar’s Vanilla Marketing Board 419
Then, in a counterfactual experiment, we reduce the number
of traders to a single one in Madagascar (i.e., we resuscitate the
marketing board) and re-impose taxation at the pre-reform
maximum rate of 82% during phase 2. Resuscitating the market-
ing board in this framework generates implied FOB and producer
prices consistent with this policy-imposed limited competition.
The simulation gives new values for uM, pM
p and XM (the quantity
of vanilla marketed by Madagascar), the latter two being fed to
the household-survey data to generate a simulated income
distribution. The inequality and poverty indices in the counterfac-
tual column in Tables 6 and 7 are the result of this exercise.
Figure 6 plots the actual and counterfactual kernel density
estimates of the distribution of income in the vanilla region.
Under the counterfactual, depending on the assumption about
elasticities, producer prices are reduced very sharply compared
with their current values (Table A1). In percent of the current FOB
price, the simulated producer price lies between 2 and 11%, as
Figure 6: Kernel Density Estimates of Income Distribution, Vanilla Region. Source:
Authors’ calculations from EPM 2001 and simulations
exporter allowed to ship fixed quantities of vanilla alongside the state market-
ing board.
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against 22% currently. The after-tax FOB price, by contrast, shoots up
by a factor ranging between 2.3 and 4.4. This price increase is
obtained by a sharp contraction of volumes exported, which go
down by a factor between 3 and 6. In accordance with intuition,
Indonesian prices and volumes both go up (although by much
less) as Indonesia free-rides on Madagascar’s output restrictions.
How much of the counterfactual’s lower producer price is
attributable to the 82% export tax versus the change in the
number of intermediaries? Multiplying uM by 1.82, we get
u˜M ¼ (0.02)(1.82) ¼ 0.036, so just eliminating the tax would have
raised producer prices to 3.6% of the FOB price instead of 2%; the
bulk of the change between actual and counterfactual is thus
attributable to the change in the number of intermediaries. These
simulations, suggesting drastic effects on prices and quantities,
no doubt provide upper bounds on the effect of change in the
policy environment induced by the 1995 reforms.
Yet, as shown by the last columns of 5.1 and Figure 6, once
re-introduced in the household survey, however, the new producer
prices turn out to have a meek effect on the distribution of income.
This is so because most of the effective consumption of Malagasy
rural households is self-produced. Cash income represents at
most 50% of income for the richest decile. Under the central
assumption about elasticities reported in Table 6, the estimated
change in the poverty headcount is that about 20,000 individuals
were lifted out of poverty as a result of the 1995 reforms.
5. Concluding Remarks
The reforms initiated in 1993 (elimination of the VMB and phasing
out of export taxes) put an end to decades of a policy of over-
exploitation of market power on the outside front and extortion of
farmer incomes on the domestic. Our attempt to evaluate the
effects of those reforms contains both good and bad news. On the
positive front, intermediation margins fell following the dismantling
of the VMB, and Madagascar has regained market share in the high-
quality natural-vanilla market with the help of major fires in its main
competitor, Indonesia, and in spite of several adverse exogenous
developments on the domestic front. But instability remains in the
natural-vanilla market, and, more ominously, following the recent
price hike, new entrants are appearing on the horizon, together
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with bio-engineered substitutes. It remains that little of this
‘improvement’ in the policy environment can be traced back to a
noticeable producer response, both according to FAO data which
suggest that yields and planted areas have remained about flat,
after a small increase in 1996, and also from the econometric esti-
mates based on household surveys. Inequality and poverty analysis
from household surveys reveal a faint improvement in the vanilla
regions relative to the rest of the rural areas along with more favour-
able wage and producer price changes than in the other regions.
To complement prima facie evidence, we turned to a counterfac-
tual experiment to assess the effect of policy reform ceteris paribus.
The results, again, contain good and bad news. Producer prices
seem to have benefited from a substantial narrowing of intermedia-
tion margins after the reforms and phase-out of export taxes which
stood in the early 1990s at extremely high levels. However, once
introduced into household survey data, this improvement does
not translate into large effects on measures of poverty and inequal-
ity simply because cash income from export crops is too small rela-
tive to self-consumption.
In a nutshell, thus, our main result is that the vanilla sector
reforms may have had a large and positive effect on producer
prices (travellers in the vanilla-producing region report a change
in consumption to beer and to the purchase of durables like
radios and bricks for construction), but the reductions in interme-
diation margins (i) were dwarfed by the volatility of world
prices and (ii) did not have a large impact on farmers’
welfare because of their extreme poverty, implying that cash
income (including other cash crops) was less than half of
household-imputed income.
For market reforms to take hold and make a difference for
households in quasi-subsistence, impact effects will only be sub-
stantial when the economy ‘re-marketises’, a process that takes
time after decades of retrenchment under strongly anti-market
policies. This is an important point that applies to several environ-
ments in SSA. In Madagascar, decades of bad policies and preda-
tory taxation have raised transaction costs to such prohibitive
levels that the market economy has largely shrunk to urban
areas, leaving rural households isolated and forced to rely on
themselves. Once this has happened, reforms affecting the price
signals faced by rural farmers can only have small effects. Only
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over time, as rural economies re-marketise, can reforms be
expected to have quantitatively large effects. This, of course,
does not mean that they do not work: rather, that they take
time and have increasing returns.
This case study suggests two further conclusions, the first relat-
ing to the difficult separation between malfunctioning markets
due to excessive government intervention and that due to market
failures. Thus, the reforms have created a regulatory vacuum in
which unchecked concentration of intermediaries could occur
again and lead to renewed exploitation of producers, although
probably not to an extent comparable to what happened under
CAVAGI. There is, indeed, anecdotal evidence that a large part of
the price hike in 2004 was caused by strategic stockpiling
between two large intermediaries in the sector.
Second, strategic behaviour in highly concentrated markets
with informational failures can lead to largely undesired outcomes,
at least from a national standpoint. Thus, when by 1993 the
conditions that made reforms politically feasible were eventually
met, rent extraction was largely exhausted and the world
market had become increasingly contestable, as shown by the rising
output of new producers. To use Margaret McMillan’s expression
(McMillan, 2001), by then the golden goose had already been killed.
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Appendix A. The Simulation Model
A.1. The Model
This appendix describes the partial equilibrium simulation model
used for the counterfactual analysis of Section 4.2. Consider first
a non-parameterised (general) formulation. Let XM and XI be the
quantities of vanilla marketed by Madagascar and Indonesia,
respectively. Let PM be the world-market price of Malagasy
vanilla and pM
P its farmgate price. The inverse demand function
for Malagasy vanilla is
Pi ¼ Pi XM; XIð Þ i ¼ M, I ðA1Þ
and the inverse supply is
pi ¼ pi Xið Þ: ðA2Þ
Let xk be the quantity of vanilla purchased and marketed by one of
ni symmetric Malagasy (Indonesian) traders, so
Xi ¼
Xni
k¼1
xk:
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Let x2k ¼
P
j=k xj. The profit-maximisation problem of
Madagascar’s trader k is
maxxk p xkMð Þ ¼ PM xk þ xk; XIð Þ  pM xk þ xkð Þ
 
xk ðA3Þ
and similarly for the representative trader in Indonesia. Let eki
D; j@
ln xk/@ ln Pij and ekiS be, respectively, the price elasticities of demand
and input supply facing trader k in country i. Maximisation of
equation (A1) gives a familiar expression equating marginal
revenue with marginal input cost, namely
Pi
1þ ti 1
1
eDki
	 

¼ pPi 1þ
1
eSki
 !
þ ci; ðA4Þ
where ci is an intermediation cost, pi
P is the producer (farmgate)
price and ti is the ad valorem export-tax rate, if any. Under symmetry
of traders, xki ¼ Xi/ni, so letting 1MD and 1ID stand for the price elas-
ticity of market demand inMadagascar and Indonesia, respectively,
eki
D ¼ ni 1iD. Substituting in equation (A4) gives
Pi
1þ ti 1
1
ni1Di
	 

¼ pPi 1þ
1
ni1
S
i
	 

þ ci; i ¼ M; I: ðA5Þ
It is easy to verify by implicit differentiation that the purchase price
pi
P is an increasing function of the number of traders, ni, and of the
elasticity of supply. In the former case, the monopsony power of
traders is reduced by large numbers, whereas in the latter it is
reduced by a flat supply curve. Note that the presence of an
export tax acts as if there was ‘double marginalisation’. To see
this, suppose that there were two layers of intermediaries, no inter-
mediation cost and no tax. Using upper-case letters for the second
layer of intermediaries, equation (A5) would then become
Pi 1 1
ni1Di
	 

¼ pPi 1þ
1
ni1
S
i
	 

1þ 1
NiE
S
i
	 

: ðA6Þ
Let t ¼ 1/Ni EiS. Then the presence of the second layer of interme-
diaries acts like an ad valorem export tax at rate t.
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In order to derive an expression for 1i
D, we now parameterise the
model. On the supply side, the farmers’ vanilla supply is
XSi ¼ ASi ppi
 1S
i ; ðA7Þ
where pi
P is the price paid to farmers, 1i
S is the price elasticity of the
farmers’ supply and Ai
S is a calibration parameter. This function
subsumes the behaviour of farmers, implicitly assuming some
hoarding behaviour whose inter-temporal aspects we leave aside.
On the demand side, the overall utility is quasi-linear in vanilla
(Xv) and an aggregate of all other goods (Xo):
U ¼ X0 þ 1~Av
X1v1=1vv ðA8Þ
where A˜v is a parameter, implying a constant marginal utility of
income and a worldwide demand for vanilla of the form
Xv ¼ AvP1vv ; ðA9Þ
1v being its constant price elasticity and Av ¼ A˜v1v/(1v 2 1)21v. The
vanilla aggregate Xv has the familiar CES form:
Xv ¼ A
X
i
biX
r
i
 1
r¼ A
X
i
biX
11=s
i
 1=ð11=sÞ
ðA10Þ
r ¼ 12(1/s), s being the elasticity of substitution between
Malagasy and Indonesian vanilla on the world market, and A a cali-
bration parameter fitted to reproduce aggregate vanilla expendi-
tures in the base solution. Worldwide expenditure on vanilla is
E ¼
X
i
PiXi: ðA11Þ
Under the assumption of two-stage budgeting, equation (A10) can
be maximised under constraint (A11) independently of upper-level
choices (between X0 and Xv), giving a demand for variety i equal to
Xi ¼ XvAs1bsi
Pi
Pv
	 
s
; ðA12Þ
where
Pv ¼ 1
A
X
i
bsi P
1s
i
 1=ð1sÞ
: ðA13Þ
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Under the assumption that traders play Cournot (by which is
meant that they take as constant the quantities marketed by both
their national and foreign competitors), it is easily verified that
1
1Di
¼ @ lnPi
@ lnXi

Xi constant
¼ 1
s
þ 1 1
s
	 

si; ðA14Þ
where si is variety i’s share of the worldwide vanilla market. This
expression can then be substituted into equation (A5) to close the
model.
A.2. Calibration and Initial Equilibrium
Intermediation cost data were provided to us by industry sources.
Elasticities are based on the econometric estimates of de Melo
et al. (2000). Their point estimates are (in algebraic form)
1ˆM
D ¼ 22.5 for the own-price elasticity of demand for Malagasy
vanilla, 1ˆI
D ¼ 21.99 for the own-price elasticity of demand for
Indonesian vanilla and 1ˆMI
D ¼ 1.7 for the cross-price elasticity,
which they find, as expected, to be symmetric (in what follows,
we ignore interaction with the artificial vanilla market). The
elasticity of substitution can be retrieved from these estimates
using the following decomposition:
s ¼ d lnðXM=XIÞ
d lnðPM=PIÞ ¼
dðlnXM  lnXIÞ
dðlnPM  lnPIÞ
¼ d lnXM
dðlnPM  lnPIÞ 
d lnXI
dðlnPM  lnPIÞ
¼ 1ðd lnPM=d lnXMÞ  ðd lnPI=d lnXMÞ
 1ðd lnPM=d lnXIÞ  ðd lnPI=d lnXIÞ
¼ 1
1=~1DM  1=~1DMI
 1
1=~1DMI  1=~1DI
ðA15Þ
where tildes indicate that elasticities are in algebraic rather than
absolute-value form. So s^ ¼ 12:5 11:7
  11:7 11:99   ¼ 1:933: In
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the simulations that follow, we use s ¼ 2. Their estimate of the
elasticity of supply is 1S ¼ 0.5, which we apply to Indonesia as well.
To complete the calibration, by choice of units, let bI ¼ 1 2bM,
allowing us to dispose of the subscript on b. Likewise, normalise
all prices to unity so that quantities can be extracted from the
value data. Thus, with
P0v ¼ 1 andP0i ¼ 1 8 i: ðA16Þ
the price index for aggregate vanilla sales, Pv, is equal to 1. To obtain
the calibrated equilibrium, the values for nM and nI are obtained by
solving equation (A5) for 1S ¼ 0.5 and s ¼ 2 given observed
markups gives nM ¼ 5.12 for Madagascar and nI ¼ 9.58 for
Indonesia. These values are smaller than the actual number of
traders but consistent with anecdotal evidence on Madagascar
according to which about five large trading houses ‘make the
market’.
With parameters calibrated to replicate observed magnitudes as
the initial equilibrium along the above lines, we have 10 equations
in 10 unknowns given initial selling prices P1
0 and P2
0 (alternatively,
one could fix initial producer prices or quantities). The eight
endogenous variables determined in the system are Pv, Xv, XM,
XI, nM, nI, pM
P and pI
P.
A.3. Perturbation of the Initial Equilibrium and Results
In the perturbed equilibrium, ni is fixed at a value that differs from
its initial value, whereas PM and PI are freed. The number of
equations and unknowns is thus unchanged. The values at which
ni are fixed are, respectively, n¯M ¼ 1 for Madagascar (mono-
psony/monopoly) and n¯I ¼ nI* for Indonesia (Cournot assump-
tion–no entry), where nI
* is the number of traders at the initial
equilibrium. We then recalculate equilibrium values for PM, pM
P ,
PI, pI
P, XM, and XI (Table A1) consistent with the model’s beha-
vioural assumption (Cournot) and no entry in Indonesia. We then
plug back the new values of pM
P and XM in the household
survey’s farmer-income data and recalculate the income distri-
bution, poverty gap and poverty headcount.
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Results are reproduced in Table A1.
Table A1: Calibrated and Counterfactual Values
Parameters
1v 1 2
1S 0.5 1 2 1
s 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
Endogenous variables: calibrated values
PM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pI
P 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pM
P 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
pI
P 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
XM 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213
XI 458 458 458 458 458 458 458
n¯M 5.12 4.86 4.20 3.94 3.74 3.48 4.20
nI 9.58 8.37 6.91 5.74 5.58 4.37 6.91
Endogenous variables: counterfactual values
PM 2.67 2.33 4.13 2.65 4.44 2.77 3.16
pI
P 1.61 1.77 1.79 1.88 1.83 1.92 1.39
pM
P 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.02
pI
P 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.21
XM 383 383 216 306 196 281 121
XI 400 438 432 456 434 463 235
n¯M 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
nI 9.58 8.37 6.91 5.74 5.58 4.37 6.91
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